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1. Genuine worlds, ersatz worlds
David Lewis has argued that impossible worlds are nonsense.1 If there were
such worlds, one would have to distinguish between the ruths about their
contradictory goings-on and contradictory falsehoods about them. One would
have to distinguish between, say, the alleged truth
(1a) In so-and-so world pigs can fly; and in that world pigs also can-
not fly,
and the contradictory falsehood
(1b) In so-and-so world pigs can fly; and it is not the case that, in that
world, pigs can fly.
But this—Lewis argues—is preposterous: there is no such distinction to be
drawn. (1a) and (1b) are equivalent.
Of course, Lewis does distinguish between the following:2
(2a) In the world of Sherlock Holmes, Watson limps; and in that world
Watson also does not limp.
(2b) In the world of Sherlock Holmes, Watson limps; and it is not the
case that, in that world, Watson limps.
(2b) is contradictory. But (2a) is, in a sense, true: there is a discrepancy in
Conan Doyle’s writings. In one of the Holmes stories, Watson limps because
                                                
1 See, e.g., Lewis 1983a: 21.
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2of an old war wound in the leg; in other stories Watson’s wound is located in
his shoulder, and he does not limp.
According to Lewis, the difference between the two cases is to be ex-
plained in terms of the different nature of the operators ‘in so-and-so world’
and ‘in the world of Sherlock Holmes’.3 ‘In o-and-so world’, if we take it
seriously, is a restricting modifier: it limits the domain of quantification of mo-
dal discourse to the domain of the world in question (for a modal realist, that
amounts to limiting the domain of quantification to a certain part of all that there
is) but has no effect on the truth-functional connectives. Thus,
(3a) In so-and-so world, it is not the case that p
(3b) It is not the case that, in so-and-so world, p
are equivalent, and so are
(4a) In so-and-so world, both p and q
(4b) In so-and-so world p, and in so-and-so world q.
This grants the equivalence of (1a) and (1b), as well as their equivalence with
(1c) In so-and-so world, pigs both can and cannot fly.
In this sense, ‘in so-and-so world’ behaves like ‘in Australia’ or ‘last Tues-
day’. By contrast, ‘in the world of Sherlock Holmes’ is on a par with ‘in the
Holmes stories’ or ‘Arthur wrote that’: these are not restricting modifiers and
do not pass through the truth-functional connectives. Hence (2a) and (2b) are
not equivalent, and neither is equivalent to
(2c) In the world of Sherlock Holmes, Watson both does and does not
limp.
Conan Doyle might have contradicted himself about Watson’s limp (2a), but he
has never written a contradiction (2c), and we certainly need not use a contra-
diction (2b) to report that fact.
There is, no doubt, a boundary to be drawn somewhere. Not every sen-
tence modifier passes through the truth-functional connectives, and some do.
Yet there is room for philosophical disagreement on where exactly the bound-
                                                
3 See, e.g., Lewis 1986: 7n.
3ary should be drawn. Lewis is no ersatzer; for him worlds are not like stories
or story-tellers. Therefore ‘in so-and-so world’ is not on a par with ‘in the
world of Sherlock Holmes’, and therefore there is no room for genuine impos-
sible worlds. But that would hardly count as a conclusive argument. Ersatz
modal realists would simply be unmoved by it. And therefore, ersatz modal
realists might in principle find room for impossible worlds.
My purpose in this paper is not to defend or attack the ersatz conception—
the view that unactualized worlds are merely linguistic descriptions of the ways
this world of ours might have been. Rather, I am interested in that conception
insofar as it pertains to the challenge raised by Lewis. Suppose we do not treat
‘in so-and-so world’ as a restricting modifier. Suppose we take Conan Doyle
to be describing a bona fide world, though a world that is impossible because
of some unfortunate discrepancies. What are we to make of the truths and
falsehoods in such a world? Can we distinguish its contradictory truths from
contradictory falsehoods about it? I want to say that we can. If an impossible
world is one in which there are discrepancies of the sort illustrated by the
Watson example—a world in which certain facts both do and do not obtain—
then we can keep such worlds under logical control exactly as we can keep the
Holmes stories under control. There are discrepancies, but these discrepancies
are local and do not force incoherence upon our discourse about them because
they can be explained away by reference to an underlying set of coherent
goings-on.
One may also view this as a concern about the prospects of defining se-
mantic and logical notions with regard to stories rather than genuine worlds,
though this conception would have to be refined in a number of ways which I
shall not consider here. In fact, in the following I shall mostly speak of models
rather than worlds or stories. A model may be inconsistent in that it may in-
volve some discrepancies. And the line I wish to consider is that the truths and
falsehoods of an inconsistent model are determined, in some way to be made
precise, by the truths and falsehoods of the family of its consistent fragments.
2. Quarantining Inconsistencies
Lewis has his own way of presenting this line of reasoning, so long as the
model is merely a story or a fictional world.4 It proceeds from equating dis-
crepancy (inconsistency) with ambiguity. Cassical models are perfectly unam-
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4biguous: each sentence can be evaluated in just one way. By contrast, incon-
sistent models are ambiguous and may support contrasting evaluations. Some
sentences may come out true on some disambiguations and false on others, and
therefore they may be regarded as both true and false in the model. However,
this is not to say that anything goes: other sentences may come out unambigu-
ously true, or unambiguously false. So inconsistencies need not lead to logical
chaos.
The world of Sherlock Holmes is ambiguously defined in this sense: it
would be more correct to speak of the worlds of Sherlock Holmes, in the plu-
ral. Each of the sentences
(5a) Watson limps
(5b) Watson does not limp
is both true and false if these worlds are taken collectively, because each is true
on some ways of sorting out the ambiguities in the Holmes stories and false on
others. Yet in no story will you find the plain contradiction
(6) Watson both does and does not limp
which is therefore unambiguously false. The world of Scherlock Holmes is no
logical chaos.
This way of dealing with inconsistencies is of course reminiscent of
Stanislaw Jaskowski’s discussive logic: the propositions that hold in a piece of
discourse are those that are put forward by at least one of the participants, who
may contradict one another while being perfectly self-consistent.5 Other authors
have proposed similar accounts, typically in connection with a conception of
truth-value gluts that is epistemic or doxastic or information-theoretic rather
than ontological.6 In general, such accounts agree that a model in which con-
tradictions are true is nonsense, but show how one can make sense of a model
with contradictory truths. For another example, Nuel Belnap considered this
view in relation to the problem of dealing with inconsistent data banks (or ex-
plaining how a computer should think, if one conceives of a data bank as an
epistemic state of the computer).7 Sam and Elisabeth enter the data. Each is
                                                
5 See Ja´skowski 1948.
6 See inter alia Grant 1975, Rescher & Brandom 1980, Jennings & Schotch 1984,
Schotch & Jennings 1989.
7 See Belnap 1977.
5trustworthy, and the computer is so programmed as to answer Yes to a query if
the answer follows from what one of its informers have entered in the data
bank. If Sam enters (5a) while Elisabeth enters (5b), there is a discrepancy. It
does not follow, however, that the computer should answer Yes to (6).
My own account of this way of quarantining inconsistencies (Lewis’s
phrase) comes from a different route, and I like to see it as embodying the
spirit of Bas van Fraassen’s supervaluationary approach.8 Gener lly speaking,
a supervaluation is just a way of evaluating sentences on a non-standard model
M on the basis of the values determined by a suitable class of standard models,
namely those models that represent the various ways in which M can be sharp-
ened. Traditionally this notion has been applied to models whose non-stan-
dardness lies in a form of incompleteness rather than inconsistency, i.e., mod-
els that are consistent but not fully determined with respect to the semantic
value of some atomic sentences. (For instance, a data bank is typically incom-
plete in this sense, since it does not contain all the information about the objects
in its domain.) If M is such a model, then its sharpenings are essentially its
complete expansions, i.e., those models that correspond to some way or other
of arbitrarily filling in the gaps in M, a d the supervaluation is naturally de-
fined as the function that registers the pattern of agreement among the valua-
tions induced by such sharpenings:
(7a) A sentence A is true (false) in an incomplete model M if and only if
A is true (false) in every complete expansion of M.
The intuition is that if we get the same outcome no matter how we fill in the
gaps, then the gaps don’t matter. For example, the world of Sherlock Holmes
is incomplete with regard to Watson’s feelings about broccoli: maybe he likes
broccoli, maybe he does not—we are not told. Clearly, this gap will be rele-
vant when it comes to evaluating a sentence like
(8a) Holmes smokes the pipe and Watson likes broccoli,
which in fact will be neither true nor false by (7a). However, the gap is irrele-
vant when it comes to a sentence like
                                                
8 See Varzi 1994, 1995 and the application in Hyde 1997; similar perspectives are
briefly considered in Visser 1984 and in Anderson et al. 1992: 523 (with reference to a sug-
gestion by Anil Gupta). As for van Fraassen’s supervaluational semantics, it dates back to
his 1966a, 1966b, though similar ideas can already be found in Mehlberg 1958, §29.
6(8b) Either Holmes smokes the pipe or Watson likes broccoli,
which in fact will come out true: the determinate truth of the first disjunct is
enough to make the disjunction true no matter how Watson feels about broc-
coli.
In short, supervaluations reduce the problem of evaluating a sentence on a
gappy model to that of evaluating it on the model’s gapless sharpenings. Now,
if M is inconsistent rather than incomplete, i.e., if it yields opposite semantic
values for some atomic sentences, then a similar insight applies. Only, in this
case we have to look for a different sort of sharpening—we have to look for
those models that correspond to some way or other of weeding out, as it were,
the gluts in M (an operation that dualizes the gap-filling operation on an incom-
plete model). Thus, the sharpenings will have to be found, not among the ex-
pansions of M, but among its contractions, specifically its consistent contrac-
tions.9 And rather than taking the logical product of the values induced by such
sharpenings, in the case of an inconsistent model we may take their logical
sum, since each sharpening delivers only part of the truth about the w ole
model. This leads to the following:
(7b) A sentence A is true (false) in an inconsistent model M if and only
if A is true (false) in some consistent contraction of M.
For instance, in the world of Sherlock Holmes a conjunction such as
(9a) Holmes smokes the pipe and Watson limps
will both true and false, because of the glut concerning Watson’s limp. How-
ever, when it comes to the disjunction
(9b) Either Holmes smokes the pipe or Watson limps,
the glut will be irrelevant: the truth of the first disjunct is enough to prevent the
whole disjunction from being false whether or not Watson limps.
We may call an assignment of truth values conforming to (7b) a sub-
valuation, to stress the duality with (7a). Going back to (5a) and (5b), then,
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lated work in belief revision theory (see Gärdenfors 1988 and Levi 1980, 1991). However, I
will not elaborate upon this connection here.
7my point is that the process whereby both those sentences come out true (and
false), whilst their conjunction (6) comes out false (and not true), is precisely a
subvaluational process of this sort: there is no consistent contraction (no single
story) that verifies the conjunction (6), though some such contractions (stories)
verify (5a) and others verify (5b).
The point is best appreciated if we consider that, on this understanding,
the relationship between (5a)–(5b) and their conjunction (6) is just the dual of
the relationship between, say,
(10a) Watson likes broccoli
(10b)Watson does not like broccoli
(neither of which has a definite truth value in the Holmes stories), and their
disjunction
(11) Watson either does or does not like broccoli
(which is nevertheless true). This is a well-known fact about supervaluational
semantics. If the expansions of an incomplete model M do not all yield the
same truth-value, then A is neither true nor false in M (a semantic gap) but the
tautologous disjunction ‘A or not A’ is true nonetheless. In other words, su-
pervaluational semantics violates the Principle of Bivalence while preserving
the Law of Excluded Middle.10 Dually, then, if M is inconsistent, then A will
be both true and false (a semantic glut) when its contractions yield different
truth-values, but the contradictory conjunction ‘A and not A’ is bound to be
false nevertheless.
Of course, as they stand conditions (7a) and (7b) are in need of various
refinements, since the gap-filling and glut-weeding operations that they pre-
suppose have only been given an approximate and intuitive characterization.
Even so, it should already be clear in what sense this account is similar to the
other accounts mentioned above. In each case, the problem of evaluating sen-
tences on an inconsistent (or incomplete) model is reduced to that of evaluating
them on a number of consistent (complete) models: as long as we know how to
do that (and we may well suppose that standard semantics will serve the pur-
pose), we know how to keep our non-standard models under control. This is
why it becomes possible to formulate the account in general terms, as in (7a)–
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8(7b). And this is what differentiates the account from the restricting-modifier
outlook endorsed by other, more familiar treatments, such as Kleene’s three-
valued semantics and its four-valued generalizations.11
The formulation given in (7a) and (7b) is actually more general than Jas-
kowski’s, though it is still rather close to Lewis’s. It does not require that we
actually construe an inconsistent model as a composition of consistent models
(Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom have introduced the term “super-
position” to indicate this mode of composition12), just as one typically does not
construe an incomplete model as the result of combining (by “schematiza-
tion”13) a certain collection of complete models. Simply, an inconsistent model
is a model with truth-value gluts and an incomplete model is one with truth-
value gaps—two opposite ways of generalizing the classical notion of a model
in which every atomic sentence is exactly either true or false. Now, classical
models induce a unique valuation function assigning a unique truth-value to
each sentence of the language. If the model is incomplete (but consistent) there
is no complete valuation to be performed. How ver there are several such
valuations that we could tentatively perform, one for each way of completing
the model. None of these valuations could legitimately qualify as the valuation
determined by the model because none of them reflects onlywhat goes on in
the model. But their intersection does, and this is exactly what the supervalua-
tionary account (7a) amounts to. Likewise, if a model is inconsistent (but com-
plete), then there are several such valuations that we could perform, one for
each way of consistently refining the model. None of these valuations could
legitimately qualify as the valuation determined by the model because none of
them reflects all the goings-on of the model. However, their union does, and
this is exactly what (7b) amounts to.
What about the case of a model that is both inconsistent and incomplete?
(The model of the Holmes stories is like that, since it has at least one glut and
very many gaps.) It is obvious that the two strategies can be combined to ac-
count for the goings-on in such models as well. In fact, (7a) and (7b) already
tell us what to do: if M is both inconsistent and incomplete, neither the sub-
valuation nor the supervaluation are uniquely defined in terms of classical
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Various semantics for paraconsistent logics could also be viewed in this light: see Priest &
Routley 1989 for a survey.
12 In Rescher & Brandom 1980.
13
 Lewis 1978 uses ‘superposition’ to indicate this mode of composition.
9truth-value assignments; but one can compute the supervaluation on the basis
of the admissible subvaluations, or the subvaluation on the basis of the admis-
sible supervaluations. In other words, if incomplete models are allowed to be
inconsistent, then (7a) amounts to the following:
(12a) A sentence A is true (false) in a model M if and only if A is true
(false) in some consistent contraction of every complete expansion
of M;
and if inconsistent models are allowed to be incomplete, then  (7b) amounts to:
(12b)A sentence A is true (false) in a model M if and only if A is true
(false) in every complete expansion of some consistent contraction
of M.
(On the other hand, in the case of models that are both consistent and complete,
these conditions reduce to the classical conditions: we are of course to under-
stand contractions and expansions in such a way that every model counts as a
(vacuous) contraction and expansion of itself.)
There is but one complication: (12a) and (12b) do not coincide. This can
be intuitively verified by evaluating a biconditional such as
(13) Watson limps if and only if he likes broccoli
with respect to the model of the Holmes stories (where the left-hand side in-
volves a glut and the right-hand side a gap). According to (12a), the bicondi-
tional is both true and false. For whether you consider an expansion where
Watson likes broccoli or an expansion where he does not, you can always
come up with two sorts of contraction: contractions where Watson limps
(making (13) true) and contractions when he is does not limp (making (13)
false). On the other hand, (12b) will evaluate (13) as neither true nor false; for
whether you consider a contraction where Watson limps or a contraction where
he does not limp, you can always come up with an expansion in which the
right-hand side of the biconditional has the opposite value of the left-hand side.
This asymmetry between (12a) and (12b) is disturbing. For if the two
schemas do not coincide, then we must choose one or the other on pain of
contradiction; yet either choice would seem arbitrary. At the same time, the
asymmetry should come as no surprise. It simply reflects the impossibility of
performing simultaneous gap-filling and glut-weeding sharpenings. So when
the sentence to be evaluated expresses an equivale ce between gluts and gaps
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(as in (13)) the difference must become apparent in some way: on one policy
gaps go first, so gluts may prevail; on the other policy it is gluts that go first,
and gaps may prevail. (When it comes to sentences that do not express an
equivalence between gaps and gluts, the two policies would seem to be in
agreement, though I will not elaborate on this conjecture here.14) One could
also consider mixed policies intermediate between (12a) and (12b), where
some sentences get super-evaluated first while the others get sub-evaluated. I
don’t know how to choose among all of these slightly different options. But in
the present context I would like to leave that issue open. Our question was
whether one can find a way of distinguishing between truth and falsehood in
an impossible world. And so far, the answer to that question is that we seem to
have many ways of doing the job.
3. Ways of sharpening
There are indeed many other, more or less interesting variations of the
strategies described above. However I shall not aim at a complete account here,
not even a survey of the main options.15 Rather, I now want to take a closer
look at the basic apparatus. In particular, I want to focus on the intuitive idea
that to any model there corresponds a class of consistent and complete shar-
penings. This idea hides various presuppositions and simplifications, some of
which are decisive when it comes to cashing out the logic of a language with
bona fide inconsistent or incomplete models.
3.1. Existence The first important presupposition is existential: the no-
tions of expansion and contraction are defined only if the class of all models is
partially ordered in terms of definiteness. This is intuitively clear, and in some
simple cases there is no question as to what the ordering should look like. For
instance, suppose we are dealing with propositional models, i.e., assignments
of truth-values to unanalyzed (atomic) sentences. In this case, a model is in-
consistent or incomplete depending on whether it assigns both values (true and
false) or no value at all to some sentences. Formally this means that a model
can be any relation between atomic sentences and truth values (and not neces-
sarily a classical total function mapping each atomic sentence to a unique truth-
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15 I have examined some options in Varzi 1995. In that context I also elaborate on the
disagreement between (12a) and (12b).
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value). Taking relations to be sets of ordered pairs, the relevant ordering  is
therefore neither more nor less than ordinary set-theoretic inclusion:
(14) M  M' if and only if M  M'.
Thus, if M is incomplete (but consistent) its sharpenings are simply its com-
plete supersets; if it is inconsistent (but complete) its sharpenings are consistent
subsets; and if it is incomplete and inconsistent, its sharpenings are complete
supersets of consistent subsets (or consistent subsets of complete supersets).
When it comes to other sorts of models, however, things are less straight-
forward. Consider for instance the models of a first-order language. In that
case we certainly want to say that the extension and counterextension f a
predicate constant in a model’s expansion (contraction) must include (be in-
cluded in) the extension and counterextension, respectively, of that predicate
constant in the model itself. If we think of an -ary predicate as standing for
some way of assigning a truth-value to each n-tuple of objects in the domain,
then this is indeed the obvious generalization of (14):
(15a) M  M' only if PM  PM' for all predicates P.
(I write ‘PM’ to indicate the interpretation of P i  M: if M is classical, then PM is
a total function assinging a truth value to each n-tuple of objects in the domain
|M|; otherwise, more generally, PM will be a relation between n-tuples and truth
values.) This much is clear. But what about the domain of quantification itself?
Certainly we want
(15b)M  M' only if |M|  |M'|.
Shall we allow for proper inclusion? Shall we allow a contraction to drop ob-
jects from the domain, or an expansion to add objects?
It would seem so. The model may be inconsistent precisely in that it con-
tains a discrepancy concerning the existence of certain individuals. Suppose the
model says that Holmes has a brother, Mycroft, but also that he was an only
child. This means that two different sorts of consistent contractions are possi-
ble: those in which
(16a) Holmes has a brother
is true, and those in which it isn’t. And there seems to exist no prima facie rea-
son to assume that the latter type of models should all have the same domain as
12
the former. We can make (16a) false simply by changing the blood tie between
Holmes and Mycroft; but we can also falsify (16a) by getting rid of Mycroft
altogether. Likewise, if the model is incomplete in that it says nothing about
Watson’s having a sister, there are two sorts of expansions in which
(16b)Watson has a sister
is true: those in which the sister is some woman already mentioned in the sto-
ries and those in which she is a totally new character, Lynda.
Now, whether the domain can indeed change as we go from a model to its
sharpenings is a question on which I wish to remain neutral here. But if we
allow for that possibility, then we face an option. Either we evaluate quantified
sentences with reference to the domain of the sharpening, or we evaluate them
with reference to the domain of the given model (for that, after all, is given).
The first option amounts to construing the valuation on a non-standard model
on the basis of the standard valuations induced by its sharpenings, as tacitly
suggested above. This would imply that, in the envisaged situation, (16a) is
both true and false and (16b) neither true nor false, respectively. This is intui-
tive. But it would also follow that
(17a) There exists an x such that x = Mycroft
(17b)There exists an x such that x = Lynda
are both true and false and neither true nor false, respectively. More generally,
it would follow that any existential statement $ xPx may come out (true and)
false on an inconsistent model by virtue of positive instances lost in the con-
traction (for instance, if Mycroft is the only individual with the property P);
and it may fail to be (true or) false in an incomplete model by virtue of positive
instances acquired in the expansion (for instance, if nobody has the property P
except for the added sister). This means that the resulting semantics would not
be monotonic, i.e., would not satisfy the conditional:
(18) if M  M', then every sentence that is true (false) in M is also true
(false) in M'.
And this seems to be a high price to pay, for after all monotonicity is implicit in
the intended reading of : what is already definitely true or false should remain
so upon sharpening. The second option amounts to construing the valuation on
a non-standard model on the basis of valuations that are not exactly standard,
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and which do not therefore yield standard truth conditions (a sort of valuations
“from the point of view” of the given model, as in Ermanno Bencivenga’s se-
mantics for free logic 16). This would satisfy monotonicity and would yield the
same values as above for (16a) and (16b) while making (17a) definitely true
and (17b) definitely false. So this can do admirably, though of course the stan-
dard quantification laws will have to be revised. In any case, the moral is that
both options will eventually result in a non-classical logic due to the falsehood
of (17a) and (17b), respectively. This is relevant, since one could otherwise be
tempted to conclude that a semantics based on (12a) or (12b) is bound to yield
a classical logic, at least as far as theoremhood goes.
3.2. Maximality and minimality Obviously things get even more
complex when it comes to models with a significantly richer fabric than pro-
positional assignments or first-order structures, but we need not go into that.
Let us now assume a partial ordering  to have been fixed on the relevant class
of all models, along with a relevant strategy for evaluating sentences on the
expansions and contractions of any given model. (We may generally think of 
as an approximation relation in Dana Scott’s sense, in which case it is most
natural to assume it induces a complete lattice ordering.17) This means that
(12a) is to be understood, broadly speaking, along the following lines:
(12a')A sentence A is true (false) in a model M if and only if A is rele-
vantly true (false) in some consistent -contraction of every com-
plete -expansion of M,
and likewise for (12b). (Henceforth I shall focus on (12a), since nothing sig-
nificant will hinge on the difference between the two policies.) The next im-
portant clarification concerns the scope of the sharpening process: How far can
we go when we expand or contract a model M for the purpose of evaluating
sentences on M? Shall we consider every consistent contraction, or only those
that are -maximal? Every complete xpansion, or only those that are -
minimal?
There is a sense in which the answer to these questions is constrained: if
the only glut in the world of Sherlock Holmes is the discrepancy about Wat-
                                                
16 See e.g. Bencivenga 1981.
17 See Scott 1972. This conception is advocated by Belnap 1977. Of course there is no
reason why one should not consider two distinct, possibly non-symmetric orderings to move
along the two directions of the sharpening process, but I shall ignore that too.
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son’s wound and consequently his limp, there is no need to consider contrac-
tions that result from deleting other parts of the stories, and it would actually be
misguided to consider contractions in which
(19) Watson was wounded
is not true. Likewise, it would be misguided to consider expansions that result
from adding inconsistencies in those parts where the stories are perfectly con-
sistent. There is, however, a sense in which a sharpening need not be the result
of adding or deleting the bare minimum that will yield completeness and con-
sistency. For instance, when we consider the contractions that emerge from the
Holmes stories by deleting the fact that Watson was wounded in the leg, we
may also want consider the result of deleting a number of other facts that
would otherwise make little sense in spite of being perfectly consistent with the
rest: in a contraction where Watson was wounded in the shoulder, Watson
need not have a limp, need not own a collection of walking canes, etc. I am not
sure that a dual example can be given for expansions, when these apply only to
consistent models (or to consistent contractions of inconsistent models). Why
should one fill in the gaps of an incomplete model to the extent of making it
inconsistent? Besides, the whole idea is to contract and then expand so as to
examine the various consistent and complete sharpenings of the given model
M, because we are assuming that nothing is controversial about the goings-on
of such sharpenings. If the sharpenings are themselves inconsistent or incom-
plete, then the entire semantic machinery is stalled. This is an argument to con-
sider only the -minimally complete expansions even if contractions need not
be -maximally consistent, at least if we base our evaluation policy on (12a).
If, on the other hand, the sharpening process proceeded in the direction defined
in (12b), by first expanding and then contracting, then of course the situation is
reversed and one may find reasons to add more than just the bare minimum
necessary to fill in the gaps. One would then consider the -maximally con-
sistent contractions of expansions that need not be -mi imally complete.
Be it as it may, all this suggests that the general evaluation rules for non-
classical models should be made more precise by providing criteria for select-
ing the relevant class of sharpenings. We may speak of adequ tely consistent
contractions and adequately complete expansions to indicate the result of such a
selection. (Of course we assume every consistent model to count as an ade-
quately consistent contraction of itself, and every complete model to count as
an adequately complete expansion of itself.) Then (12a') can be amended as
follows:
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(12a")A sentence A is true (false) in a model M if and only if A is rele-
vantly true (false) in some adequately consistent -con raction of
every adequately complete - xpansion of M.
3.3. Admissibility There are other, independent reasons for amending
the evaluation rules in terms of selected contractions and expansions, as indi-
cated in (12a"). For, generally speaking, there is no reason why the goings-on
of an inconsistent or incomplete model should be evaluated by considering
every possible sharpening. Generally speaking, one should only consider con-
tractions and expansions that are admissible in some relevant sense. For in-
stance, if the model is meant to represent the world of Sherlock Holmes, then
not every way of filling in the gaps will do, for the fiction is meant to be read
against a background of implicit facts (as Lewis pointed out18). The stories do
not specify Watson’s date of birth. But an expansion which says that
(20a) Watson was born in 1750
would be too far-fetched to be included in the admissible sharpenings of the
world of Sherlock Holmes. Likewise, some complete expansions should be
left out on account of certain “penumbral connections” (in the terminology of
Kit Fine19) determined by the given (incomplete) model. For example, both
Watson and Lestrade’s dates of birth are left undefined in the model. However,
suppose the model says that
(20b)Watson is older than Lestrade.
Then a complete expansion in which Watson was born in 1850 and Lestrade in
1849 should not be admissible. Analogous considerations apply of course to
glut-deleting sharpenings. If both Mycroft and Lestrade are modelled as tall
and also as short, and if Mycroft is unquestionably taller than Lestrade, then a
consistent contraction in which Mycroft is short and Lestrade tall is simply not
admissible.
This introduces a complication. For, in general, there is no guarantee that
every model comes with a non-empty class of complete and consistent shar-
penings of the relevant sort. It follows that the limit of a chain of contractions
(expansions) is itself a contraction (expansion). We may even suppose that
                                                
18 This is the point of Lewis 1978.
19 See Fine 1975. A similar point is made in Kamp 1975.
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such a limit is adequately consistent (complete). But of course it does not fol-
low that the limit is admissible in the more general sense that we are now con-
sidering.20 What, then, if there are no admissible sharpenings?
As it stands, (12a") delivers the following responses. (i) If M is a com-
plete but inconsistent model, and if it has no admissible consistent contrac-
tions, then no sentence can be assigned a truth-value in M. (ii) If M is a con-
sistent but incomplete model, and if it has no admissible complete expansions,
then every sentence will be assigned both truth-values in M (vacuously). (iii)
In general, if M is neither consistent nor complete, then every sentence will be
neither true nor false if M has no admissible consistent contractions, and every
sentence will be both true and false (vacuously) as long as M has a consistent
contraction with no complete expansions. Now, this can’t be right. If an in-
consistency is so bad as to be ineradicable, one might perhaps find reasons to
accept (i): one might say that it is hopeless to ask for an assignment of truth-
values in such circumstances. But then, what parallel motivation could justify
(ii)? One can hardly think of any reasons to evaluate a sentence as both true and
false because of an unfillable gap. Even worse, one can think of no reasons to
make a sentence true and false because of an unfillable gap in a consistent con-
tractions (as (iii) has it), especially if other contractions work fine.
One way of resolving the issue would be to go precisely in the opposite
direction, turning (i) and (ii) around. An incurable inconsistency then results in
an abundance of truth-value gluts, and an incurable incompleteness results in
an abundance of truth-value gaps. (iii) would then go along the same lines: a
lack of admissible consistent contractions would yield an abundance of truth-
value gluts, and a contraction with no admissible complete expansions would
yield no truth-values and could therefore be ignored. I do not intend to pursue
this suggestion here. After all, when there are no admissible sharpenings the
whole rationale behind (12a") founders, and everything is up for grabs. It may
even be that this is where the boundary should be drawn between reductionist
semantics of the sort under discussion, where all truth-value assignments are
classical at a remove, and a full-blooded paraconsistent semantics. (Or perhaps
this is where the boundary should be drawn between manageable and unman-
ageable inconsistencies.) Be it as it may, what I want to stress here is simply
                                                
20 One form of unsharpenability is examined in Collins & Varzi 1997. Fodor and Le-
pore’s criticism of supervaluationism in 1996 may also be regarded as embodying a form of
radical skepticism concerning sharpenability: what is unsettled in the actual world is unsettled
in every world. See also Priest 1998 for some examples of unsharpenable impossible worlds.
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that one must make room for some way of resolving the issue. From the pres-
ent perspective the case of unsharpenable models is sui generi, and the basic
evaluation rule should take this fact into account.
To this end, let us make explicit the presupposition that the admissible
contractions and expansions (including M itself if it is either consistent or com-
plete) be properly sharpenable. Let us say that a consistent contraction of a
given model M counts as admissible only if it has some adequately complete
expansion; and let us say that a complete expansion of M counts as admissible
only if it has some adequately consistent contraction. Then the point is that
(12a") must be amended along the following lines:
(12a ''' )A sentence A is normally true (false) in a model M if and only if A
is relevantly true (false) in some admissible, adequately consistent
-contraction of every admissible, adequately complete -expan-
sion of M.
Non-normal truth and falsehood can then be handled according to one’s favor-
ite views about the goings-on of an unsharpenable unsharp model. But this
must be done independently of (12a ''' ).
3.4. Relativity One last complication. Suppose that the model is un-
sharpenable—suppose there is no admissible, adequately consistent contraction
of the world of Sherlock Holmes due to some deep discrepancies about Wat-
son’s old war wound. Why should this have any effect on the attribution of a
truth-value to an innocent sentence such as
(21) Holmes smokes the pipe ?
Why should this sentence fail to be normally true simply because of those dis-
crepancies about Watson? After all, everything said so far embodied the intui-
tion (familiar from paraconsistent logics) that inconsistencies need not metasta-
size throughout the entire language. Condition (12a ''' ) (a d its preliminary ver-
sions) capture this intuition in connection with sharpenable inconsistencies.
Why should things be so radically different when it comes to indelible incon-
sistencies?
Another way of putting the same question is more cognitively oriented.
As it is, (12a ''' ) requires that in order to evaluate a sentence such as
(5a) Watson limps
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we consider models that are complete and consistent relative to the entire lan-
guage. But there is no obvious reason why such a task should require a radical
operation like that—an operation that in some cases may even be impossible. A
more natural account would be to consider sharpenings that are complete and
consistent relative to (5a): models in which all the relevant facts are specified so
as to make (5a) true or false, as the case may be. Simil r considerations apply
of course in case of a gap. Why should the task of evaluating a simple sentence
like
(10a) Watson likes broccoli
require a global, simultaneous grasping of the indefinitely many sharpenings of
the world of Sherlock Holmes? It should suffice to consider models that are
complete and consistent relative to (10a).
The general point is that even when a model as a whole is unsharpenable,
some (perhaps even all) of its proper fragments may be individually sharpe-
nable, and for many purposes that is all that matters. One should be able to
proceed as far as possible in the attribution of normal truth-values before giv-
ing up the approach, but (12a ''' ) m kes this mpossible. To overcome this
limitation, let us say that a model is A-con istent or A-complete (where A is
any sentence) if and only if it is consistent or complete, respectively, relative to
that fragment of the language that is explicitly involved in A.21 (In familiar
cases, e.g., sentential or first-order languages, the relevant fragment is simply
the set of symbols occurring in the construction tree of A.) Let us then suppose
that the relevant notion of sharpening is redefined accordingly in terms of A-
consistent contractions and A-complete expansions. In particular, an A-con-
sistent contraction counts as admissible only if it has some adequately A-
complete expansion, and an A-complete expansion counts as admissible only if
it has some adequately A-consistent contraction. Then (12a ''' ) can be amended
along the following lines:
(12a '''' )A sentence A is normally true (false) in a model M if and only if A
is relevantly true (false) in some admissible, adequately A-consis-
tent -contraction of every admissible, adequately A-complete -
expansion of M.
                                                
21 The notion of a model that is both A-c nsistent and A-complete is similar to Benci-
venga’s notion of an A-world. See e.g. Bencivenga 1978.
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Of course, if M does not have any admissible A-sharpenings, then (12a '''' ) will
deliver the same unfortunate output as (12a ''' ): A cannot be normally evaluated.
But in general (12a '''' ) will be much more efficient than (12a ''' ).
3.5. Relevance There is still room for discussion. For instance, sup-
pose the Holmes stories contain some such recalcitrant sentence A: there is no
way to make the stories consistent (say) with respect to A. Then (12a '''' ) will
fail to handle, not only A, but also sentences such as
(22a) Holmes smokes the pipe, and also A.
(22b) Holmes smokes the pipe, or else A.
Now, this seems fair in the case of (22a): we must be able to handle A in order
to handle the conjunction. However, (22b) seems different: here the first dis-
junct is normally true (and only true) in the world of Sherlock Holmes, and
that seems sufficient for the purpose of evaluating the disjunction as true. The
problematic status of A is arguably irrelevant.
 There are various ways of dealing with such cases. However, I think
the best option is indeed to accept this consequence of (12a '''' ) and deny special
status to (22b) in spite of the appearances. After all, the sense in which a dis-
junction with a true disjunct should come out true regardless of the value of the
other disjunct is supervaluational: the disjunct is true because il would be true
(truth-functionally) no matter what. But this motivation cannot serve its pur-
pose here. (22b) cannot be normally true in this sense, for there simply is no
admissible way in which it could be true (truth-functionally). One can still
stipulate that a disjunction with a true disjunct is to be true (and only true), or
that a conjunction with a false conjunct is to be false (and only false); but that
would indeed be a stipulation from the present perspective. Therefore it should
be handled as a case of non-normal truth, leaving (12a '''' ) as it stands.
4. Sharpenability and logic
The upshot of this discussion is that the basic apparatus needed to make
sense of inconsistent (and incomplete) models in the spirit of §2 is bound to be
rather intricate.22 Now, this is not to say that the approach is unworkable. To
the contrary, (12a '''' ) is indicative of a certain flexibility. As long as the relevant
                                                
22 Kyburg 1997 has recently pointed out a number of related subtleties.
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gluts and gaps are sharpenable, we can be assured that their admission will not
bring logical disaster in its wake. Inconsistency need not yield contradictions,
and tautologies do not imply completeness.
Formally, this general fact is reflected in the abnormal behavior of the re-
lation of logical consequence, which will not in general satisfy the adjunctive
and disjunctive laws. In particular, the following will fail:
(23a) A, Ø A  A Ù  Ø A
(23b)A Ú  Ø A  A, Ø A
There are in fact three distinct ways of defining the entailment relation, and
each of them violates the above classical principles:
(24a) S 1 G  if and only if, in every model in which every element of S
is true, some element of G  is also true.
(24b) S 2 G  if and only if, in every model in which every element of G
is false, some element of S  is also false.
(24c) S 3 G  if and only if S 1 G  and S 2 G  .
It is in any of these senses that the inferences from (5a)–(5b) to (6) and from
(11) to (10a)–(10b) are blocked. On the other hand, the failure of (23a)–(23b)
goes hand in hand with the fact that all tautologies remain true—and all contra-
dictions false—in every model, or at least in every model where they can be
adequately sharpened (and assuming that the strategy for evaluating sentences
on a model’s sharpenings i classical enough to satisfy the usual truth-
functional conditions). More generally, if we focus on such models, contradic-
tions imply everything and tautologies are implied by anything:23
(25a) A Ù  Ø A  S
(25b) S   A Ú  Ø A
Of course, if we end up with unsharpenable gaps and gluts, and if our treat-
ment of such cases makes (some) contradictions non-normally true, or (some)
tautologies non-normally false, then (25a)–(25b) do not hold either, and every-
thing is up for grabs.
                                                
23 See Varzi 1994, 1995 for proofs and related results.
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Now, this gives a measure of the sort of departure from classical logic
called for by (12a '''' ). One could say that the resulting logic is paraconsistent,
but it is only half-heartedly paraconsistent (in the terminology of Priest and
Routley 24) unless one allows for models that are truly unsharpenable. For in
the absence of such models we lose classical entailment (more precisely, clas-
sical multi-premiss inferences) but we stick to the classics as far as tautologies
and contradictions are concerned.
Two issues arise at this point. The first is how these constraints on shar-
penability relate to our initial concern. Perhaps it is precisely these constraints
that make the difference between ersatz worlds and genuine, Lewisean worlds
—we can sharpen a way of representing a world but not the worlds them-
selves, not those “huge things” in one of which we have our being. If so, im-
possible worlds may well be nonsense, as Lewis has it, unless one goes para-
consistent all the way. On the other hand, for an ersatzer such constraints need
not be drastic. There may be some unsharpenable goings-on, but one can still
make sense of the rest as long as one does not close under classical logical im-
plication. In this regard, (12a '''' ) serves well its purpose.
The second issue concerns the relationships with classical logic. Exactly
what classic patterns of validity are lost besides (23a)–(23b)? And how do
such facts as (25a)–(25b) extend to non-truth-functional (e.g., quantificational)
logical principles? As far as I know, both questions are very hard even in rela-
tively simple contexts. For one thing, the first question seems to eschew a gen-
eral answer already at the level of propositional logic, even assuming complete
sharpenability and universal admissibility for all models.25 This is o because
in that case the notion of logical consequence becomes extremely language sen-
sitive in the presence of gluts or gaps. It is true, for instance, that all instances
of adjunction of the form (23a) and all instances of disjunction of the form
(23b) fail. But if ‘p’ and ‘q’ are sentence symbols, the following instances are
perfectly valid unless a restricted relation of admissibility is used:
(26a) p, q  p Ù  q
(26b)p Ú  q  p, q
Among other things, this means that the law of substitution will not hold any
longer: propositional symbols cease to behave as variables, as it were.
                                                
24 Priest & Routley 1989, p. 160.
25 This is detailed in Varzi 1994, pp. 83ff.
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On the other hand, the second question seems to call for different answers
even with regard to the same language. It is here that the subtle complications
involved in (12a '''' ) become relevant. We noted in § 3.1 that as soon as we
move to a language with quantifiers, the process whereby a sentence is evalu-
ated on a model’s sharpenings may not conform to the standards of classical
logic. Thus, for instance, if we take the process to be performed “from the
point of view” of the given model (so that quantified sentences are evaluated
with reference to the domain of the given model), then we may go in the direc-
tion of a free logic. This means that not only classical entailments, but also
classical validities are lost. In particular, (25a) and (25b) cannot be extended to
their natural first-order analogues:
(27a) (" x)A(x) Ù  Ø A (a)  S
(27b) S   ($ x)A(x) Ú  Ø A (a).
(27a) may fail because the premise can be true when the model is A (a)-inc n-
sistent (if we read entailment as 1 or as 3) or because the premise can fail to
be false if the model is A(a)-incomplete (if we read entailment as 2 or 3). Du-
ally for (27b). By contrast, if we did not allow for contractions and expansions
that involve a change of composition in the domain of quantification, then it is
apparent that (27a) and (27b) retain their classical status exactly like (25a) and
(25b).
These considerations are enough to suggest that the model theory behind
(12a '''' ) can be a messy business. This is fair, however, since we are talking
about messy models after all. Whether genuine possible worlds are like that (if
not worse), or whether the only genuine worlds are those that match the stan-
dards of perfectly sharp models, those are very difficult questions that I think
we are entitled to postpone.26
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